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Social Media & Competition Law
Aleksandra GEBICKA &Andreas HEINEMANN*
Virtually all of the important IT companies have been under scrutiny from the competition
authorities, often on a worldwide basis. However, this is not yet true for the main actors in the
field of social media.This article explores the competition law concerns of this sector focusing on
the most popular platform, i.e., Facebook, and its potential abuses of dominant position under
Article 102 TFEU. In the world of social media markets, market definition is complicated
because of the two-sided nature of the platforms. Hence, a new version of the SSNIP test is
proposed here which rejects the application of a price-based test to free Internet services and
re-evaluates the importance of quality as opposed to price. Network effects and other barriers to
entry are traditionally discussed for the establishment of dominance. Prohibited behaviour may be
either exploitative or exclusionary. Potential exploitative conduct is reviewed from the perspective
of private social media users, which highlights the controversial attitude of Facebook towards
changes in administration and design by the platform, protection of information and deletion of
profiles. Past IT-related case law is still relevant for the identification of exclusionary behaviour,
especially as regards the rules on tying, bundling and leveraging. Developing data protection law
influences restrictions on data portability. Overall, the hopeful conclusion tends to be that
competition law misgivings could be allayed by a suitable adaptation of the general regulatory
framework to avoid abuse in this rapidly growing area.
1 DEVELOPMENTS IN IT COMPETITION LAW
1.1 STARTING POINT: THE NOTORIOUS IT CASES
It is no coincidence that the IT sector has produced some of the most important
competition law cases worldwide.The particular competition law exposure of this
industry is due to its economic features: the considerable increase in efficiency is
not simply due to new technologies, but also to direct and indirect network effects
triggering a tendency towards natural monopolies.This inclination is strengthened
by high economies of scale and scope, and the need for standardization creating
more advantages, path dependency and lock-in.Against this backdrop, competition
law control is inescapable, although its national or regional character is not always
easy to reconcile with the international orientation of the related companies.Thus,
* Aleksandra Gebicka, LLB with European Legal Studies at King’s College London and University of
Zurich. E-mail: aleksandra.gebicka@kcl.ac.uk. Andreas Heinemann, Professor of Commercial,
Economic and European Law at the University of Zurich. E-mail: andreas.heinemann@rwi.uzh.ch.
Gebicka, Aleksandra & Heinemann, Andreas. ‘Social Media & Competition Law’. World Competition 37,
no. 2 (2014): 149–172.
© 2014 Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands
many IT competition law cases exist at least in an American and in a European
version, although other jurisdictions have taken the stage in the meantime.
The IBM case1 , for example – the earliest of the classical IT competition law
cases – concerned market power based on a de facto standard. In 1981, IBM had
brought to market the first Personal Computer (PC). The manufacturers of
peripherals and software became dependent on being ‘IBM compatible’ and
requested that IBM provide the necessary interface information. Although an
antitrust procedure in the US was closed without result, the firm had to give a
commitment to the European Commission to disclose the requested information
to interested parties in a timely manner.2 This outcome has become typical of the
approach to IT competition cases. In all jurisdictions, the goal of keeping markets
open has to be weighed against the impact of competition law intervention on the
incentives to innovate. However, the outcome of this balancing may vary. In the
US, the risks of regulation for the incentives to innovate are emphasized, and
the self-healing powers of markets are relied upon. In the EU, by contrast, the
responsibility of the state to keep markets contestable is underlined, and the
positive influence of competition law application on innovation is highlighted. For
example, keeping markets open may promote follow-on innovations of third
parties and even of the dominant firm itself, since it is exposed at least to
competition by substitution.
The different intensity of competition law control on both sides of the
Atlantic may be illustrated by the Microsoft3 case. In both jurisdictions, competition
authorities intervened. In the EU, however, the degree of intervention was higher
as more interface information had to be disclosed and the freedom to integrate
new functions into the operating system was more restricted.4 Similar patterns
may be discerned in the Intel and in the Google cases. In the EU, Intel was fined for
abuse of dominance by giving conditional rebates with exclusive effect and by
making direct payments to retailers that give preference to Intel’s products.5 In the
US, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) entered into a consent agreement
according to which the firm renounced exclusivity contracts and undertook not to
1 Cf. Case C-60/81 IBM v. Commission [1981] ECR 2639.
2 European Commission, Fourteenth Report on Competition Policy 1984, Brussels, Luxembourg
1985, nn. 94–95. The commitment was in force until 1995, see Inge Graef, How can Software
Interoperability be Achieved under European Competition Law and Related Regimes? J. European
Competition L. & Prac. 2013, at 4–5 (Advance Access 25 Nov. 2013).
3 European Commission Decisions: Microsoft IP/94/653 [1994], COMP/C3/37.792 [2004], OJ
L32/23 [2007].
4 For a comparison of the European and the US Microsoft case see Andreas Heinemann, Compulsory
Licenses and Product Integration in European Competition Law – Assessment of the European Commission’s
Microsoft Decision, IIC, 63, 75–76, 78–79 (2005).
5 European Commission Decision, 13 May 2009 – Intel, OJ 2009 C 227/13.
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discriminate against companies which buy processors from competitors.6 In the
Google case, different objections were at stake, primarily violations of search
neutrality, for example by giving precedence to its own services over those of
competing firms. In the US, the FTC did not intervene in the core business of the
search engine, but contented itself with having Google abstain from exclusivity in
the AdWords business and to allow firms to opt out of Google’s vertical search
offerings while still appearing in the ‘organic’ search list.7 In the EU, by contrast,
Google will have to improve search neutrality considerably by extending links to
rivals.8
The cases mentioned concern some of the most important companies in the
field of hardware, software and the Internet.As social media moves centre stage, the
question arises if competition law problems exist in this field, too.9 There is not
yet a Facebook antitrust case, but strong network effects and other particularities
indicate considerable market power as well as the potential for anticompetitive
behaviour. Before presenting the outline of this article, it is useful to briefly
describe the world of social media. The overview will show that the relevant
websites are quite heterogeneous. As this article is on the competition law aspects
of social media, the most powerful of these virtual communities, i.e., Facebook, will
serve as the continuous paradigm. A limitation of the subject has to be made,
however. Because of the sheer volume of data available on social networking
websites, many firms now closely monitor these portals and use them as sources
for competitive intelligence.The point here is to say that, while the behaviour of
any firm on social networking sites can be subject to competition law inspection,
this article focuses on the actual or potential behaviour of social networking sites,
in particular Facebook.10 We will discuss the relevant problems on the basis of EU
competition law.
6 FTC, Decision & Order, 2 Nov. 2010, http://ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9341/101102inteldo.pdf (accessed 3
Mar. 2014).
7 FTC, 3 Jan. 2013, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2013/01/google.shtm (accessed 3 Mar. 2014).
8 See for example Joaquín Almunia, The Google Antitrust Case: What is at Stake? 1 Oct. 2013,
SPEECH/13/768, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/search.htm (accessed 3 Mar. 2014).
9 The discussion of competition law aspects of social media is still at the beginning. First reflections
have been made by: Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust and Social Networking, 90 N.C. L. Rev. 1771
(2012); Christopher S.Yoo, When Antitrust Met Facebook, 19 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1147 (2012) with an
overview on early case law (in the US) at 1158–1166 available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2160519 (accessed 3 Mar. 2014); Andreas Heinemann, Wettbewerb auf den Märkten der
Informationstechnologie – Die Perspektive des Europäischen Kartellrechts’, in: Astrid Epiney/Stefan Diezig
(eds.), Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Europarecht 2012/2013, Zurich (2013), p. 355, 370–372 Rolf
H. Weber, Competition Law Issues in the Online World (2013), part 4.3, available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/link/20th-St-Gallen-ICF.html (accessed 3 Mar. 2014).
10 Seth M. Cohen, Zurich North & David K. Park The Opportunities and Risks Posed by Social Media
for Antitrust Compliance, http://www.bna.com/the-opportunities-and-risks-posed-by-social-media/
(2012): ‘New social media do not change the substance of antitrust and competition law’.
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1.2 THE PHENOMENON OF SOCIAL MEDIA
1.2[a] Definition
Social media, i.e., social networking sites, are web-based services that allow
individuals to construct a public or semi-public profile within a limited forum, to
articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection (‘friends’ on
Facebook), and to view and traverse their list of connections and those made by
others within the system.11 Examples of such platforms are: XING, Facebook,
Myspace, Google+, and studiVZ.The differences lie in the features offered: sharing
of written statuses on your own profile, videos, images, chat, private messages,
creation of online albums to store photos and share them with others. There are
debates about including Twitter in this group because its service allows sharing of
short text messages or ‘tweets’ with anyone who decides to ‘follow you’, i.e., read
what you post on your profile.12 Another question revolves around the position of
LinkedIn, because of its professional focus, and yet another question regarding
video-sharing on YouTube. Their inclusion or exclusion depends on the
characterization and interpretations given to the definition of a social networking
site.13 What is clear is that Facebook satisfies both the broad and narrow
definitions.
1.2[b] From a Large Number of Websites to a Unique One
The real expansion of the social media phenomenon worldwide hit at the turn of
the twenty-first century as a new and appealing tool for communication. The
social face of the internet was no longer reserved solely for the adventures of
celebrities, but the regular citizen could now also post details about his life for
everyone to see. There were many websites, some remaining national in their
territorial coverage and languages (V Kontakte in Russia, NaszaKlasa and Grono
in Poland, StudiVZ and SchülerVZ in Germany), and others wider reaching
(Skyblog, Friendster, MySpace),14 and they were referred to as YASNS, ‘Yet
Another Social Networking Service’.The biggest triumph of all of these, however,
is undoubtedly Facebook.
11 A precise definition, including the difference between ‘social network sites’ and ‘social networking
sites’, has been elaborated in Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites: Definition,
History, and Scholarship, 13 J. Computer-Mediated Communication 210, 211 (2008).
12 Twitter and Tumblr have also been defined as ‘micro-blogging’ websites: see http://www.britannica.
com/EBchecked/topic/1370976/Twitter (accessed 3 Mar. 2014).
13 See supra n. 11.
14 For this historical discussion illustrated with an almost exhaustive list of websites, see the entirety of:
Boyd/Ellison, supra n. 11.
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The success story is well-known. In 2004, a group of Harvard students
decided to create a website for sharing opinions about photos.The site started as a
campus-only website and expanded beyond the University of Harvard to more
universities, then to private persons with internet access, until it finally became a
global phenomenon. At its initial public offering on 17 May 2012, the company
was valued at USD 104 billion. Even if everyone does not use Facebook, everyone
knows about it, and it has outgrown most other websites in number of users and
popularity.15 It can be argued that the main reason for this popularity is the fact
that it does not limit itself to a specific group of people. Currently in the
international arena, excluding countries such as Russia or China which protect
their markets, Facebook’s only official real competitor is Google+, launched by
Google Inc. in 2011,16 which naturally leads to a number of competition law
concerns.
1.3 OUTLINE OF THE REASONING
The aim of this article is to carve out the potential competition law problems with
the activities of Facebook as an economic entity, in its capacity as a social media
platform. So far, competition authorities have not intervened in this field.
However, in view of the growing significance of social networking, it may be only
a question of time before the first cases will arise. The focus of this article is on
unilateral conduct and the concept of dominance in the social media market,
through the prime example of the omnipresent Facebook. Upon close scrutiny, it
appears that the conventional instruments, such as the SSNIP test, have to be
adapted in order to fit to the environment of ‘free’ internet services. As a result, a
proper definition of relevant markets in the context of social media will be
possible (see section 2 below.). On this basis, firms in a dominant position can be
identified (see section 3 below.). As dominance is not anticompetitive in and of
itself, business strategies have to be assessed as to their legitimacy. To this end,
exploitative and exclusionary abuses have to be identified (see section 4 below)
before conclusions can be drawn (see section 5 below).
15 See the World Map showing the popularity of social networks around the world with the changes
and evolution of Facebook between August 2008 and October 2011, http://oxyweb.co.uk/blog/
socialnetworkmapoftheworld.php (accessed 3 Mar. 2014).
16 Google does not seem to hide the fact that Google+ is an official competitor to Facebook. See, for
example, online news article Social Wars! Google Unveils Facebook Competitor Google+ available at:
http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2011/06/28/social-wars-google-unveils-facebook-competitor-google/
(accessed 3 Mar. 2014). And Google Launches Google+ Facebook Competitor, Publishes New Privacy
Policies available at: http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2011/06/29/google-launches-facebook-competi
tor-publishes-new-privacy-policies/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2014).
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2 MARKET DEFINITION IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL MEDIA
2.1 THE TWO-SIDED NATURE OF SOCIAL MEDIA MARKETS
2.1[a] Definition
In order to properly define what market Facebook operates on, we must look at
the effects that using it may have on the lives, choices and attitudes of its users.
Facebook is an internet website, but the internet market as such is particularly
broad and heterogeneous, with websites varying in scope and importance for users
(e-mail, research, shopping, entertainment, advertising, etc.). In consequence, we
must identify the distinguishing characteristics of Facebook as a website, what
services it offers to its users and what it receives in return, in order to achieve a
relatively straightforward definition of the relevant market – the prerequisite to the
analysis of whether there is a dominant position and abuse thereof.17
A two-sided market is a platform which connects two distinct groups of users
seeking a mutual benefit,18 thus permitting both bodies of customers to obtain
value from one another. For example, credit cardholders get interest benefits and
more flexibility by using credit cards, and conversely merchants may generate more
business by accepting credit cards. The platform profits them both in different
ways. A further example is an online dating platform, which is dependent on two
incoming sides of interest – men and women, who can be viewed as distinct
groups of users who benefit through connections forged via the website.The end
value of the website is dependent on how many individuals for each group use the
platform, because that way it will attract more individuals from the other group,
who will in turn attract more from the first and so on and so forth.The platform
must cater to two distinct groups simultaneously in order to maintain them as
users, and it is that maintenance that allows it to remain attractive to both
separately.
17 See also the reflections on market definition and market power in the context of social networking
sites by Spencer Weber Waller, supra n. 9, at part I B.
18 For a general discussion of various kinds of two sided-markets, see David S. Evans, Two-Sided Market
Definition (2009), p. 2, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1396751 (accessed 3 Mar. 2014). We
applied his definitions. See also Patrick G.J.Van Cayseele & Stijn Vanormelingen, Prices and Network
Effects in Two-Sided Markets:The Belgian Newspaper Industry, Working Paper Series, 26 Feb. 2009, p. 2,
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1404392 (accessed 3 Mar. 2014). This is an example of the
application of the two-sided market definition and how it applies in the newspaper sector. For an
analysis with particular regard to the application of competition law, see Lapo Filistrucchi, Damien
Geradin & Eric van Damme, Identifying Two-Sided Markets, 36 World Competition 33 (2013), who
distinguish between qualitative and quantitative aspects of two-sidedness.
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2.1[b] Facebook as a Two-Sided Market
There are two distinct ways in which Facebook can be considered as a two-sided
market. As already stated Facebook is a social networking site – a place to
construct a profile, connect with other users, share information about oneself and
view that shared by those to whom we are connected.The first two-sided aspect is
the linking of people to others and creating a web of social connections. When
Facebook was first designed it was limited to linking users with other users.
However, now a different second aspect has emerged, which still makes Facebook
a two-sided market, but no longer private user to private user.
Facebook currently serves as a point of contact between its private users – the
same ones it was connecting before – and other users, usually professional, who
advertise their products or services targeting specific groups. It is a profitable
relationship for both sides, as private profile holders receive information about
products they may wish to purchase, and for advertisers Facebook is a platform
through which to reach old and new customers. Facebook earns most of its
money through advertising and thus can afford to remain free for private users.19
It grew out of its purely social bubble into a forceful two-sided platform, and has
to be analysed accordingly, as traditional antitrust analysis and economic models
have to be modified in order to make sure that they do not only show one side of
the enterprise. Much like newspapers that are full of colourful pictures designed to
attract readers’ attention, one can no longer separate Facebook or its private users
of the advertising, which attracts considerable online criticism. It is undeniably
true that the advert percentage on the average newsfeed sometimes spreads over
half the surface of the page.20 This is to illustrate the fact that Facebook is now a
two-sided market in two dimensions – between friends and private persons and
the advertisers who target them.
The question has been raised whether stronger weight should be given to the
second side of this market, i.e., to the advertising business in its context to the
user-oriented side. In this view, internet activities are primarily seen as a means to
generate advertising revenues.The first side of the market, i.e., the kind of services
proposed over the internet, is perceived as an instrument to obtain information on
19 Cf. Nicholas Carlson, How Does Facebook Make Money, available at http://www.businessinsider.
com/how-does-facebook-make-money-2010-5 (accessed 3 Mar. 2014).Thanks to earnings from one
side, a two-sided market may afford to offer its services to the other side below incremental costs, or
in our case, free profiles.
20 For sites that criticize the amount of advertising on Facebook, see for example: Dan Graziano,
Facebook’s Advertising Strategy Could Be its Downfall available at: http://bgr.com/2013/07/02/face
book-criticism-advertisements/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2014). And a comparison of Google and Facebook
in graphs and pictures Google versus Facebook – from an Advertising Perspective, available at http://www.
tnooz.com/2013/05/08/news/google-versus-facebook-from-an-advertising-perspective-infographic/
(accessed 3 Mar. 2014).
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users who use the offered services.The relevant market in this sense would extend
to any ‘monetizing of users’ information by online advertising’ encompassing
online search and social networking websites.21 On the basis of this broad
concept, companies like Google or Facebook would operate on the same relevant
market so that it would be less probable that any of them have a dominant
position.
In our view, this perspective does not achieve the goal of better addressing the
two-sided nature of web portals. The realization of revenues depends on the
success of the main activity of the platform. Therefore, the substitutability of the
specific service from the perspective of its users is highly relevant. Competitive
pressure – or its absence – could not adequately be taken into consideration if the
kind of services offered to the consumer is modified or disappears entirely behind
the general commercial interest underlying any business activity. This does not
argue against larger market definitions on advertising markets22 as long as the user
side of the market is not neglected. It is true that the ‘free’ character of certain
internet services creates problems, and that the two-sided nature of markets has to
be taken into consideration when assessing market power and problematic
behaviour. However, these problems should rather be fixed by refining traditional
market definition tests as proposed in the following discussion.
2.2 SSNDQ:A NEW TEST TO DEFINE A MARKET FOR A FREE PRODUCT OR
SERVICE?
After looking at the nature of the markets that Facebook operates on, the next
important step for the purposes of applying EU competition law on abuse of
dominant positions is the precise definition of what said markets cover.This step is
needed because once we define a market we can determine whether a company
has a dominant position on that market, and only then whether it can or has
abused that position.
Initially, relevant product markets are delineated according to the criterion of
demand substitutability, i.e., the interchangeability of products from the perspective
of the other market side.23 The problem in our context with this traditional
21 See the discussion by Florence Thépot, Market Power in Online Search and Social Networking: A Matter
of Two-Sided Markets, 36World Competition 195, 217–218 (2013) referring to Waller, supra n. 9.
22 Thépot, supra n. 21, at 210–214 with a thorough analysis of online/offline and search/non-search
advertising.
23 Cf. RichardWhish, Competition Law 28–31 (6th ed., Oxford 2009).
WORLD COMPETITION156
approach is the following: the Commission Notice on Market Definition24
suggests a test to define the relevant product or service market, based on a ‘Small
but Significant Non-Transitory Increase in Price’ (SSNIP).25 This means that after
supplier A decides to increase the prices of his products by a small margin, but for
a period of time lasting enough to be felt as non-transitory by the market, then
consumers affected by the change will turn to supplier B for the same product in
numbers significant enough for the original increase in price and ensuring loss of
trade to not be profitable for supplier A. If this is the case, then the two products
offered by suppliers A and B are within the same relevant product market. The
European Commission makes use of the SSNIP test often, but not systematically.
In fact, it has never given the SSNIP test absolute value. In the notice on market
definition, for example, it has introduced the SSNIP test as ‘one way of making
this determination’, i.e., the determination of demand substitutability from the
consumers’ perspective.26 The Courts of the European Union have not explicitly
endorsed the SSNIP test, but they mention it when they examine the legality of
Commission decisions in which the test has been used.27 There is no need for the
courts to subscribe to specific tests of market definition, since, according to their
position, ‘in so far as the definition of the relevant market involves complex
economic assessments on the part of the Commission, it is subject to only limited
review by the Courts of the European Union’.28 Hence, for the courts, even more
than for the European Commission, the SSNIP test is one of many different ways
to determine demand substitutability.
A cautious approach to the SSNIP test is indeed advisable.A price-related test
must fail in situations where the price is not the decisive parameter for the
purchasing decisions of the clients. Moreover, the SSNIP test comes from the static
world of price theory which is particularly inadequate for highly innovative and
dynamic industries. Above all, the SSNIP test is designed for conventional markets
where monetary charges apply.29 It does not work where the remuneration takes
another form, for example attention30 or personal data.31 This is exactly the case
24 Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of Community
competition law, OJ 1997, C 372/5.
25 Ibid., para. 17.
26 Ibid., para. 15.
27 See for example Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak v. Commission [1996] ECR I-5951, para. 16; Case
T-30/89 Hilti v. Commission [1991] ECR II-1439, n. 56; Case T-427/08 CEAHR v. Commission
[2010] ECR II-5865, n. 69; Case T-336/07 Telefónica and Telefónica de España v. Commission, not yet
reported, para. 139.
28 Case T-427/08 CEAHR v. Commission [2010] ECR II-5865, para. 66.
29 Therefore, the SSNIP test is in principle applicable to the advertising aspect of two-sided markets.
But even here, it has to be adapted in order to respond to the two-sided context, see Thépot, supra
n. 21, at 215–216.
30 See the groundbreaking study of Georg Franck, Ökonomie der Aufmerksamkeit – Ein Entwurf, Munich
1998; for the subject area of this article see David S. Evans, Attention Rivalry among Online Platforms,
2013, p. 4, available at, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2195340 (accessed 3 Mar. 2014).
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with Facebook or other social media sites as these websites do not charge for the
use of their services. Hence, the easiest reaction would be to join the critics and to
plead for the withdrawal of the SSNIP test, but this path shall not be taken here.
The SSNIP test has its virtues and is helpful to a certain degree if its inherent
limitations (e.g., the cellophane fallacy) are not overlooked.
It is possible to adapt the test to the world of ‘free’ Internet services. The
starting point to defend this statement is to acknowledge that consumers will
necessarily take the quality of a product in relation to its price into consideration.
This criterion can be used as an alternative basis for a modified SSNIP test.
Facebook’s source of pride is its reliability, i.e., an accumulation of small certainties
which make its use a pleasure: the servers rarely crash, there are few login or
password problems, and the protection of one’s profile is relatively high. Thus the
statistically average user encounters relatively few purely ‘usage’ issues. This does
not include the changes in the layout of the page, which may not please the
private user, but constitutes a conscious choice of the proprietors of the website.
Facebook has accustomed its users to a certain level of quality. This is a very
laudable accomplishment because, as a general rule, the average user will consider
it a dependable website. However, you could say that this has somewhat spoiled the
consumer, in the sense that now the lack of problems and availability of various
features is something he expects from the website, rather than being an additional
quality that makes usage easier.Taking this reasoning further, if Facebook suddenly
suffered a small but significant non-transitory decrease in the quality (SSNDQ) of
the website32 – i.e., the average user would have problems logging in, the site
would often be down for maintenance, crash due to user overload, or become a
victim of spam or hacking – then the question we might ask is whether the
private user will switch to other social media sites, such as Twitter or Google+, or
even slightly more distant sites like Tumblr or YouTube. If we assume that a quality
decrease were a way for Facebook to limit its maintenance expenses, and if at the
same time we accept that the value of the site and the income it generates (be it
from advertising to users or users paying for features) depends on large amounts of
users present in the network, then the test is whether private users will switch to
other networks in numbers significant enough for the decrease in income to be
felt on the Facebook balance sheet. If they do impact their finances then ‘it is not
worth it’ for Facebook to cut its maintenance budget by decreasing its quality.
It is important to underline that the decrease in quality must be small, not
wide scale, and non-transitory, constant, not only on one occasion. The moment
the average user switches to Google+ in order to use the same features that
31 Spencer Weber Waller, supra n. 9, at part I.B.3.
32 The SSNIP test suffers from its fixation on price although it is generally recognized that many other
parameters are relevant in the competitive process.
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Facebook offers, the two websites belong to the same relevant market.The test can
be performed further until the consumers no longer switch.
2.3 CONCLUSIONS ABOUT DEFINING THE RELEVANT MARKET
A brief comment must be made about the famous ‘Cellophane fallacy.’33 If one
starts to analyse a product which is already offered at monopolist price, then many
other products will be substitutes for consumers who are not able to afford the
expensive one, which will lead to a distorted market definition. One must start at a
competitive price and then increase it to identify real change. The issue with
Facebook is, it is submitted, the complete opposite. If there were twenty social
media websites available for free, then the average user will pick the one that
crashes least, is the most reliable, protects his data best, and is the most
user-friendly. However, if the majority of people use Facebook, then there is an
overwhelming probability that a new consumer will choose this platform, too,
even if it has faults, in order to be in contact with everyone.
In conclusion to this analysis, there are two ways of perceiving the situation.
Either we accept that the user market will be defined as social media of various
kinds, including Twitter and Google+, which is an official competitor for
Facebook34 and offers many of the same sharing and gaming features. Another
option would be to view Facebook as its own market, because people who already
use it will not switch because all their friends are on Facebook, even though they
may dislike the increasing amount of advertisements. Consequently, they are
locked in users.35 It is submitted in the following, however, that in either of these
markets Facebook would be considered to have a dominant position.
3 DOMINANCE
3.1 MARKET SHARE
A dominant position on the market has been defined as ‘a position of economic
strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective
competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to
behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and
33 Pierluigi Sabbatini, The Cellophane and Merger Guidelines Fallacies Again, Government of the Italian
Republic (Italy) - Italian Competition Authority (24 May 2001), p. 1, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=271113 (accessed 3 Mar. 2014).
34 See supra n. 16.
35 Cf. Spencer Weber Waller, supra n. 9, at part IV: ‘If Facebook’s market dominance remains durable,
the question of market power becomes easier over time as network effects and data lock-in make it
increasingly likely that Facebook is a market onto itself ’.
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ultimately of its consumers’.36 In order to determine dominance, several factors
have to be taken into account, in particular actual competition, potential
competition and countervailing buyer power. For actual competition, market
shares play a preeminent role. Without going into a theoretical academic debate
about what exactly should be included in the calculation of market share, we will
utilize practical data concerning the number of private users and advertisers, and
the number of visits on the website, which give a rough idea of how ‘popular’ (i.e.,
how important) that website is in the market.
It is agreed that at the time of writing that Facebook is the leading ‘social
media’ website, even given a broad construction of the term,37 with over 55% of
the market share of visits in June 2013, with YouTube coming second with less
than 25%. Another indication of Facebook’s dominance is territorial dominance –
by listing countries where it is the most used social media.38 A third source shows
Facebook’s dominance by measuring internet traffic. Facebook held almost three
quarters of the market share in social media in March 2013, again followed by
YouTube with less than one-tenth.39
3.2 NETWORK EFFECTS AND BARRIERS TO ENTRY
Following the usual competition law analysis, market share is not the only element
determining dominance. There is a presumption of market dominance where the
market share in the relevant market exceeds 50%, but it can be counteracted by
low barriers to entry for competitors.40 It is submitted that barriers to entry for
websites involving profiles for users are very high because people naturally prefer
to stick to their old profile instead of constantly creating new ones. Furthermore,
there is the idea of ‘I will have a Facebook profile because everyone is on
Facebook’, which suggests facility and as such guarantees less effort, and in
consequence attracts more and more people. The consequences of this statement
are twofold. First, Facebook is dominant to its current average users because they
are locked-in and will not change social networks, even though they are
completely free to do so if they wish. But they do not leave because the profile has
36 Case C-27/76 United Brands v. Commission [1978] ECR 207, para. 65.
37 Including video sharing with YouTube, professional networks like LinkedIn, and forums like
Yahoo!Answers. Cf: http://www.dreamgrow.com/top-10-social-networking-sites-by-market-share-
of-visits-june-2013/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2014).
38 Cf: http://www.socialmediastrategist.co.uk/blog/1-news/204-facebooks-market-share-june-2013
(accessed 3 Mar. 2014).
39 Cf: http://socialmediatoday.com/1311981/social-media-marketing-share-2013 (accessed 3 Mar.
2014).
40 European Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Art. 82 of
the EC Treaty [now:Art. 102 TFEU] to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ
2009 C 45/7, para. 16.
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been created, all the friend connections are established and they probably have
links to their favourite advertising pages.
The second repercussion stemming from the amount of people already
owning profiles, as well as new arrivals, is that the utility for a single user is
increased by the fact that more and more people join the same network.This is a
positive externality called ‘network effects’.41 These exist when the general value
of the network – i.e., connection and interaction between individuals – increases
as more and more users join that network. Furthermore, this reasoning can be
applied to both aspects of Facebook’s two-sided market nature.42 On the mere
social contact side, the more friends the average user can connect with via
Facebook, the more his profile and participation are worth to him personally,
because he does not have to go elsewhere to keep in touch.43 On the other hand,
for advertisers who post on the site, the more users join, the more people they can
reach with their product offer, while the users are attracted by the fact that they
can find out information about products and services which are valuable to them
as consumers (e.g., prices, sales, descriptions) on Facebook.
It is submitted that it would be extremely difficult for a newcomer to beat
both the lock-in of old users and the attraction of new ones.Thus, the barrier that
any competitor would have to overcome is very high. It is argued that Facebook is
not only dominant because of its market share, but also due to the difficulties of
competitors to enter, let alone to succeed in the relevant market of social media.
Dominant firms are subject to specific rules of conduct under Article 102 TFEU,
as they must not abuse their privileged position. In the following, a review of the
most striking possibilities for abuse of a dominant position on the part of
Facebook is given.This list is by no means exhaustive, rather it is meant to cover
obvious issues that could constitute points of interest from a competition law point
of view.
4 ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION
Article 102 TFEU covers two forms of abuses. On the one hand, exploitative
abuses which are designed to exploit customers or suppliers, for example getting
consumers to pay more than justified by the costs incurred plus a reasonable profit,
and exclusionary abuses, directed at competitors and attempting to limit their
scope, eject them from or prevent them from entering the market. By contrast, the
41 See the analysis in Patrick G.J. Van Cayseele & Stijn Vanormelingen, Prices and Network Effects in
Two-Sided Markets: The Belgian Newspaper Industry, Working Paper Series (26 Feb. 2009) available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1404392 (accessed 3 Mar. 2014).
42 See Yoo, supra n. 9, at 1148–1154. He does a detailed economic analysis of network effects in the
precise context of Facebook.
43 Spencer Weber Waller, supra n. 9, Antitrust and Social Networking, 90 N.C. L. Rev. part I B 4 (2012).
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American Sherman Act is said to focus more on exclusionary behaviour and
attempted monopolization of the market.44
The vital issue with all of the following types of abuses is that they are all
defined, designed and analysed in the context of a product or service a consumer
pays to receive. Facebook is free, so one has to adapt the logic to see how else a
dominant position can be abused and the consumer harmed without him paying.
4.1 POTENTIAL EXPLOITATIVE ABUSES
One of the most characteristic differences between US antitrust law and European
competition law is the treatment or rather the existence of exploitative abuses. For
instance, US antitrust law does not prevent monopolies from charging monopoly
prices.45 In European law, by contrast, firms in a dominant position must not
directly or indirectly impose unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair
trading conditions, Article 102(2) lit. a TFEU. It is important to note that,
according to this prohibition, potentially abusive conduct is not restricted to the
field of price-related behaviour but can consist of any other exploitation of
economic power conferred by the dominant position. In the same vein, the
limitation of production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers (Article 102(2) lit. b TFEU) may amount to an exploitative abuse.46
The deeper reason for the prohibition of exploitative abuses in European
competition law is the wish to correct market results in the absence of effective
competition. In well-functioning markets, firms are controlled by their
competitors.The inherent self-correcting forces of the market prevent firms from
charging excessive prices because they would lose customers to their competitors.
This mechanism does not work anymore if dominance has conferred the ability to
behave independently from other market participants.47 In this case, the control by
competition must be replaced by a specific legal (i.e., artificial) control against the
abuse of dominant positions. It is worthwhile to underline that the existence of
44 Cf. Giorgio Monti, EC Competition Law 217–218 (Cambridge 2007).
45 U.S. Supreme Court – Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. Linklinecommunications, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009). To
the contrary, high prices are considered important for spurring competition, see US Court of
Appeals for the DC Circuit, 22 Apr. 2008, No. 07-1086, Rambus v. FTC, 18: ‘high prices and
constrained output tend to attract competitors, not to repel them’. In the same sense U.S. Supreme
Court – Verizon Communications Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis v.Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
46 Cf. the European Commission’s Guidance on abusive exclusionary conduct, supra n. 40, at para. 19,
according to which the harm to consumer welfare may not only occur in the form of higher prices
but also ‘in some other form such as limiting quality or reducing consumer choice’. The
Commission’s Guidance only applies to exclusionary, not to exploitative conduct (see para. 7 of the
document), but the adverse effects on consumers have to be dealt with in the context of exclusion
as well.
47 See supra n. 36.
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exploitation does not require the proof of harm to competition. The prohibition
of exploitative abuses aims at protecting the other market side as such.48 However,
exploitative and exclusionary conduct meet where the exploitative conditions
prevent customers from choosing competing products.
4.1[a] Forcing Decisions upon Users
These principles can also be applied to the phenomenon of social media.There are
changes that Facebook can impose on its private users’ profiles over which they
themselves have no influence. The average user signs up and has to accept all the
personal profile aspects and administration modifications without having the
opportunity to object. Remedies such as online petitions have an unfortunate
reputation of disappointing ineffectiveness.49 The issue is that the average user does
not have a commercial contract signed with Facebook that guarantees what their
profile is going to look like or what features will be available. He does not have
anything to base a claim on and has to accept that Facebook has exclusive
jurisdiction regarding their profile, at least when it comes to the external
appearance. Of course he can select his own profile picture, but has no say
regarding the physical layout of the information or where the ads appear on the
screen.Arguably, Facebook changes the layout to make it easier for users to browse
the website and keep up to date with their friends’ activities.Therefore, it might be
considered a laudable attempt at usage optimization, but the average user may have
liked the previous layout more than the current one.
The relevant question in our context is if unilateral changes to product
qualities of a social media platform may amount to an exploitative abuse. Starting
point is the fact that suppliers, including dominant ones, are perfectly entitled to
change their supplied products catalogue and the products’ features. For dominant
firms, this freedom ends where changes of the product have to be qualified as a
limitation of the production or technical development in the sense of Article
102(2) lit. b TFEU.50 Therefore, a decrease in quality might be considered an
abuse,51 especially if one keeps in mind that the same criterion determines –
48 Cf. Richard Whish, Competition Law 706–715 (6th ed., Oxford 2009).
49 Which is not to say that users do not try, see for example this invitation to share your opinion:
Facebook Timeline: Here’s How Users Would Change It, http://mashable.com/2012/01/27/facebook-
timeline-changes-communit/ (accessed on 3 Mar. 2014).
50 See, for example, Case C-179/90 Merci Convenzionali Porto di Genova v. Siderurgica Gabrielli [1990]
ECR I-5889, para. 19; Case C-41/90 Höfner and Elser v. Macrotron [1991] ECR I-1979, para. 31.
51 See Bruce Lyons, The Paradox of the Exclusion of Exploitative Abuse, in The Pros and Cons of High Prices
67 (Swedish Competition Auth. ed., Kalmar 2007): ‘In principle, product quality, service levels and
product range may also be abused by a dominant firm. It is difficult to measure these in order to
compare them with an appropriate benchmark, but the same, to a lesser extent, can be said of high
prices’.
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according to the SSNDQ test proposed above – the relevant market and thus
restricts the users’ fallback options. It has to be underlined that this is, in the
context of social media, a purely hypothetical statement. Of course, it is a
well-known and universally acknowledged fact that Facebook is very active in
constantly trying to innovate.52 There could not be a greater difference to the
‘quiet life’53 of the state monopolists in the cases cited above.54 However,
the question may be asked if the ‘special responsibility’55 does not require the
dominant firm to respect certain procedural safeguards before recurring to
far-reaching modifications of the product, for example timely announcements in
order to allow users to withdraw personal material which they prefer not to show
in the new surroundings. If the average user has nowhere else to turn to, as in the
social media market, then dominant websites such as Facebook must be very
careful when taking far-reaching decisions with respect to their main product
because the users are much less likely to leave despite being dissatisfied with it.56
4.1[b] Protection of Information Shared Online
When the average user signs up to Facebook, he transfers far reaching rights to his
data. It is true that the scope of the transfer of rights is outlined in the Facebook
Data Use Policy57 and declarations, but these texts leave open what the website is
really entitled to do with the information it receives. Of course, it is comforting to
read announcements that all data is securely kept on their servers, and that they
anonymize the information before transmitting it to anyone, but it does not
provide comfort and safety. While there are options available to hide private
information, it is all nevertheless logged on the Facebook servers and then used to
personalize ads on your profile. For example, one author designed an
advertisement that was specifically targeted at his girlfriend, without ever
mentioning her name, only where she graduated from and what she was interested
52 See, for example, Kennt mich jemand? Neue Graph Search von Facebook, available at, http://www.
sueddeutsche.de/digital/neue-graph-search-von-facebook-kennt-mich-jemand-1.1718917 about a
new Facebook function called ‘Graph search’ to collect data about boost connections between its
users (accessed on 3 Mar. 2014).
53 John R. Hicks, The Best of All Monopoly Profits Is a Quiet Life, in Annual Survey of Economic Theory:
The Theory of Monopoly, 3 Econometrica 1, 8 (1935).
54 See supra n. 50.
55 Case 322/81 NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v. Commission of the European Communities
[1983] ECR 3461, para. 57.
56 Moreover, alternatives are diminished by Facebook’s recent takeovers of Instagram and WhatsApp
(whereas the takeover of Snapchat failed). For the takeover of WhatsApp see Facebook to Buy
Messaging app WhatsApp for $19bn, available at, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-26266689
(accessed on 3 Mar. 2014).
57 Cf: https://www.facebook.com/about/privacy (accessed 3 Mar. 2014).
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in.The ad then appeared on her profile.58 Thus, even if her name is stripped off of
the average user’s personal info, it is doubtful that there will be someone who has
graduated from the same school in the same year, went to the same University,
done the same internships and ended up in the same professional situation. This
topic is much more within the realm of data protection than competition, but the
amount of data available to Facebook (including IP addresses) is considerable and
users are forced to disclose it in order to be able to participate.
The question has to be asked therefore, if violations of the company’s data use
policy or exaggerations within this set of rules may amount to an abuse for the
purposes of competition law. If we begin with the idea that the remuneration for
social media services paid by the user is not monetary in character, but instead
consists of his attention (to the website, including advertisements which generate
income for the website’s owner) and in his personal data (allowing personalized
advertising and data marketing), an undue increase in the use of personal data may
very well be compared to excessive prices. An unreasonable expansion of the data
use policy and, all the more, violations of data protection rules, may therefore
constitute an abuse of a dominant position.Thus, in the field of social media, data
protection law and competition law may overlap considerably.
It has to be underlined in this context that the application of competition law
is not excluded or predetermined by data protection law. It is very well
conceivable that behaviour which is perfectly legal under data protection law
violates competition law. In European competition law, this possibility results from
the hierarchy of norms with Articles 101 and 102 standing above ‘simple’
regulations or directives. But even if this were not the case, competition law
pursues goals different from data protection law so that different results are
possible. For a comparable question, i.e., the relationship between competition law
and telecommunications law, the European Court of Justice has underlined the
autonomy of competition law from other branches of law. Even if tariffs have been
authorized by the competent regulator, there may be still an abuse of a dominant
position if the undertaking in question had a sufficient margin to adapt its
behaviour.59 These principles apply to the relationship of competition law and
data protection law.A dominant undertaking is subject to more restrictions than an
ordinary firm without that degree of market power.60
58 Katherine K. Roberts, Privacy and Perceptions: How Facebook Advertising Affects its Users, 1 The Elon J.
Undergraduate Research Commun. 24, 26 (2010).
59 Case T-271/03 Deutsche Telekom v. Commission [2008] ECR II-477, paras 85–151 confirmed by Case
C-280/08 P Deutsche Telekom v. Commission [2010] ECR I-9555.
60 For the interface between data protection law and competition rules with respect to the procedure
of competition authorities, see Monika Kuschewsky & Damien Geradin, Data Protection in the
Context of Competition Law Investigations: An Overview of the Challenges, 37 World Competition 69
(2014).
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4.1[c] Onerous Deletion
Third, there are two elements that create an unbreakable oath of allegiance with
Facebook. Account deactivation, and deletion is an onerous process which does
not lead to the deletion all of one’s personal data from the servers, and one’s
account can be easily reactivated.61 The average user, however, may not desire to
delete his account, because studies have shown signs of a growing ‘Facebook
addiction’,62 especially amongst young people at school or university. In
competition law, it is recognized that ‘unfair trading conditions’ in the sense of
Article 102(a) TFEU may also consist of an unreasonably long duration of
contractual relationships.63 If in practice it is not possible, with reasonable efforts,
to delete one’s profile and to terminate the use of one’s personal data, the limits of
an appropriate contract term seem to be overstepped.
If one bears in mind that one of the tributes paid by the user is personal data,
it seems excessive to impose a duty unlimited in time. It follows from Article
102(a) TFEU that the dominant firm proposes a reasonable mechanism to delete
one’s profile. In the case of Facebook, it is suggested every step of the way to the
user not to delete, but to temporarily deactivate their profile while their data is
kept warm for when they come back.64 Actual deletion is theoretically possible,
but requires the user to wait two weeks after confirming during which time they
cannot log back in or use any Facebook option on any device because that would
cancel the delete order – which from the website’s perspective is an argument that
they make efforts to make consumers happy and accept them even if they change
their minds, but is actually a way to suggest to the consumers that they will want
to come back. One must also be very careful to delete all apps on other devices
and the cache on the computer because any inadvertent sharing or logging in will
jeopardize the whole process.
There are two issues with this: the first is that even after the two weeks expire,
some data is still kept in their system for ‘technical reasons’,65 which means the
user is never completely gone off the internet, and second, it seems as though the
name of the account still remains in one’s old friends’ friend lists, albeit without
61 Cf. Rolf H.Weber, supra n. 9, at part 4.3.d.
62 See The True Costs of Facebook Addiction: Low Self-esteem and Poor Body Image available at: http://www.fo
rbes.com/sites/alicegwalton/2012/04/05/the-true-costs-of-facebook-addiction-low-self-esteem-and-
poor-body-image/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2014).And How is Facebook Addiction Affecting Our Minds? available
at: http://mashable.com/2012/11/03/facebook-addiction/ (accessed 3 Mar. 2014).
63 Andreas Fuchs/Wernhard Möschel, in Ulrich Immenga/Ernst-Joachim Mestmäcker (eds.), Wet-
tbewerbsrecht,Vol. 1/1 EU, 5th edition, Munich 2012,Art. 102 AEUV n. 187.
64 See, for simplicity http://www.wikihow.com/Permanently-Delete-a-Facebook-Account, no. 5
(accessed on 3 Mar. 2014). Facebook also provides a mechanism for downloading all the data that
one has ever shared.
65 See http://www.pcworld.com/article/242956/how_to_delete_your_facebook_account.html (ac-
cessed on 3 Mar. 2014).
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any hyperlink or information.66 In summary, it is difficult to delete one’s profile,
psychologically and technically, and Facebook is almost patronizing in its insistence
that you really want to stay or really want to come back, for example once exam
period is over. Average internet users are not ready to allocate much effort to
delete profiles like that, and are thus less likely to look elsewhere. This is all the
more important since here exploitative abuse overlaps with exclusionary abuse.
The difficulties in deleting one’s profile on a certain social media website may
prevent users from migrating to a competing one. In the following chapter,
exclusionary behaviour in the context of social media has to be reviewed in detail.
4.2 POTENTIAL EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES
4.2[a] Tying and Bundling
This part covers the most obvious exclusionary abuses that one would expect from
a company in Facebook’s position. Tying is a commercial sales practice whereby
one product or service is sold as a mandatory addition to the purchase of another
product or service, making the sale of one good to the consumers de facto
conditional on the purchase of a different good.The consumer is forced to pay for
the second good in order to get the one he actually wants. Bundling describes
offering several products for sale as one combined product or ‘package deal’,
usually for a lower price than the sum of each of the products’ prices if purchased
separately. It is slightly less aggressive than tying, where you cannot get the
products separately, but remains nevertheless a powerful incentive for the consumer
to buy the bundle. Apart from the exploitative aspects, the main problem of tying
and bundling is the risk of foreclosure.67 Competition on the market for the tied
product may be hampered if clients have to buy the product with the
manufacturer of the tying product.68 A thorough analysis is necessary in order to
determine the impact of tying and bundling on competition in the different
markets.69
66 This point is an observation from the authors, dated September 2013, and might no longer be
accurate.
67 Leading tying cases include Case T-30/89 Hilti v. Commission [1991] ECR II-1439; Case C-333/94
P Tetra Pak v. Commission [1996] ECR I-5951. For a critical analysis, see Hedvig Schmidt,
Competition Law, Innovation and Antitrust – An Analysis of Tying and Technological Integration
(Cheltenham 2009).
68 For a competition law analysis of tying and bundling see the European Commission’s Guidance on
abusive exclusionary conduct, supra n. 40, at paras 47–62.
69 See for example Case T-79/12 Cisco Systems and Messagenet v. Commission [2013], not yet reported
(Microsoft/Skype merger): The European Commission and the General Court did not accept
Cisco’s argument that tying or bundling of Skype with Microsoft’s product would significantly
impede effective competition.
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Upon creating a Facebook account, the average user was introduced to a
multitude of different features, including sharing posts, photos, links, applications
and videos, private messages, and even instantaneous chat exchange with a video
feature. Arguably all of these features are different products, with each having a
separate competitor: YouTube for video sharing, Twitter for short status updates,
Skype for video calls and chat, Instagram for sharing photos with interesting
editing options for visual effects.70 When a private user signs up to Facebook, he
automatically has the possibility to use all of these features. It has already been
mentioned that the strength of Facebook lies in its universality, in the sense that
one and the same profile can be used for all of those different features, without
having to go through the administrative trouble of organizing various profiles on
separate websites. The average user is not forbidden from using other platforms,
quite the contrary, if you upload a YouTube video it can be played directly on the
Facebook website. If one pushes the analysis further, from a purely product-related
perspective, all of those features are bundled together into one big platform offered
to users. They are even tied, because you cannot choose which features are
available, you get them all or none.
There is an entire series of comments that go alongside this analysis. First and
foremost, Facebook is a free website for any private user to join and use. Thus,
offering as wide a choice of features as possible only works to Facebook’s
advantage, because it shows that they made the effort of giving the average user
lots of choice in ways to share and develop his experience of social media. The
case that comes to mind in this context is Microsoft v. Commission71 , where
Microsoft was accused of anti-competitive behaviour because it bundled the
Windows operating system with the Windows Media Player, thus creating
disincentives for OEMs and users to install competing media players.72 The
European Commission imposed a duty on Microsoft to offer a Windows version
without the media player. This remedy was not successful because Microsoft was
allowed to sell the full-fledged Windows version at the same price as the version
without the media player.73 Consequently, very few people were interested in the
slim version. However, the European Commission made clear that the dominant
70 Instagram has now even become a verb describing editing a photo: ‘She instagrams all her photos’.
71 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v. Commission of the European Communities [2007] ECR II-3601. See
for example Carl Baudenbacher, The CFI’s Microsoft Judgment – Three Seconds That Changed the IT
World, European L. Rptr. 342 (2007); Microsoft on Trial: Legal and Economic Analysis of a Transatlantic
Antitrust Case (Luca Rubini ed., Cheltenham 2010).
72 The other part of the case concerned the market for server software. The refusal to supply
developers of competing server software with the information necessary to create interoperability
with the ubiquitous Windows operating system was considered abusive. Microsoft had to make the
relevant interface information available to all interested undertakings.
73 See the in-depth analysis by Nicholas Economides & Ioannis Lianos, A Critical Appraisal of Remedies
in the E.U. Microsoft Cases, Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 346 (2010).
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position on a market of strategic importance must not be used to conquer adjacent
markets by measures other than competition on the merits.
Subsequently, the same reasoning was applied to the browser market.
Microsoft’s Internet Explorer was pre-installed with the operating system and
difficult to get rid of. This was held to be anti-competitive behaviour because
Microsoft, which was dominant on the market for PC operating systems, was
hindering effective competition in the web browser market, as fewer consumers
opted to use alternative browsers.The company was forced to allow consumers the
choice between its own browser and several alternative browsers by providing a
‘choice’ or ‘ballot’ screen upon first starting a new computer.74 The outcome in
the browser case seems to be a much more appropriate remedy than that in the
media player part of the Commission’s 2004 decision, whereby the dominant firm
is not prevented from integrating new functionalities in its products and
developing these further. At the same time, competitors get the same platform to
recommend their own products and allow users decide which one they prefer.
Returning to Facebook, other social media providers, e.g., Skype, could argue
that Facebook is hindering competition in the online video call programmes as
Facebook offers the option to its users without the possibility of deleting it or
indicating the existence of competing video call systems.The same is true for the
other supplementary functions of Facebook.75 In our view, however, there is an
important difference to the Microsoft constellation. In the case of Facebook, there is
no software whose strategic importance comes close to that of an operating system
and whose outstanding importance is used in order to impose other products or
functions.76 As long as social media has not gained fundamental significance
comparable to that of an operating system, the freedom of companies to develop
their products further should prevail. Even if network effects of social media are
strong, the dissemination of platforms such as Facebook does not reach the same
percentage as the one of the Windows operating systems installed on personal
computers.The average user is fully entitled never to use the Facebook video calls
feature and use Skype instead. Facebook is free and voluntary to sign up to, not
pre-installed and forced upon users.Thus, by signing up, the average user chooses
to use Facebook and be exposed to all its advantages, because one cannot dispute
that from a consumer entertainment point of view, having as many features as
possible greatly contributes to the value of the website. Against this backdrop,
74 European Commission Decision 16 Dec. 2009 – Microsoft (Tying), OJ 2010 C 36/7. However, the
company did not respect its commitments and was heavily fined for non-compliance with the
commitment decision; see European Commission, 6 Mar. 2013 – Microsoft (Tying), OJ C 120/15.
75 The relevance of the bundling part of the European Microsoft decision is underlined by Spencer
Weber Waller, supra n. 9, at part IV.
76 For the importance of Window’s ubiquity in the Microsoft case, see nn. 430–472, 806, 833,
843–878, 951, 1066 of the European Commission’s decision COMP/C3/37.792 [2004].
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the balance of interests which always has to be considered in order to find an abuse
in the sense of Article 102 TFEU, does not militate in favour of Facebook being
obliged to advertise the features of its competitors.
4.2[b] Leveraging
Leveraging describes the use by a firm of its dominance on a market to conquer
and or abuse another market, usually neighbouring or downstream. The
dominance and the abuse do not happen on the same relevant market.77 The
reason for including this in the context of Facebook’s activity online is that
because the company is so strong in the market of social networking websites,
there seems to have so far been very little stopping it from expanding onto other
markets without necessarily being dominant there. For example, Facebook allows
video sharing, the realm usually attributed to YouTube.The latter does not offer all
the other features that Facebook does that define it as a social media website, but
can compete on the arguably separate but neighbouring market of video sharing.
The main problem of leveraging is that a firm uses its dominance on a main
market to be successful on related markets without relying simply on better
products or lower prices.78 In the field of social media, this risk exists, but seems to
be low at present. Services in question are offered ‘for free’ and users are not
prevented from choosing the service they value most.The situation would change,
however, if consumers’ choices were reduced. Consequently, the market has to be
observed carefully with respect to strategies which do not aim at convincing users
in terms of quality, but rather to urge them to use the dominant firm’s products.
4.2[c] Data Portability
Social media practice different policies as regards data portability.While some allow
the transfer of user data to competing websites, others prohibit it, or at least make
it difficult. This phenomenon is most easily exemplified with the ‘sync’ option of
most applications: you can sync your email addresses so that they all arrive into the
same inbox, or your mobile phone contacts with your computer ones, or, in our
case, linking Facebook accounts to any other sharing device. The question arises
whether restrictions on data portability amount to an exclusionary abuse if they
are imposed by a dominant undertaking. It can be argued that restrictions on data
portability render market entry of competing firms more burdensome. On the
77 See the analysis of leveraging by Giorgio Monti, EC Competition Law 186–195 (Cambridge 2007).
78 See Andreas Heinemann, The Contestability of IP-Protected Markets, in Research Handbook on Intellectual
Property and Competition Law 68–69 (Josef Drexl ed., Cheltenham 2008).
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other hand, dominant firms are not under a duty to help competitors.Therefore, a
considerable margin should be left as regards the design of portability rules.79 The
situation would be different if a social media supplier were not content with not
granting data portability but would impose exclusivity on its users thus preventing
them from using competing platforms. A comparable behaviour is part of the
European Google case. The European Commission expressed concerns about
exclusivity agreements imposed by Google on publishers and advertisers using its
advertising programmes. Under the binding commitments proposed by Google to
the European Commission, Google will remove exclusivity requirements and
admit that advertisers can run search advertising campaigns at the same time across
Google’s and competing search advertising platforms.80 In the context of a
dominant social media supplier, exclusivity requirements would raise similar
foreclosure concerns. Besides, data portability raises numerous questions which
should be dealt in the context of data protection law. In the EU, the Draft Data
Protection Regulation contains a right to data portability and specifies some
important details in this respect.81
Finally, the American case Facebook v. Power Ventures82 raises most of the
aforementioned issues. Power Ventures accused Facebook of exclusionary conduct
by linking its user accounts to those of the same people on Gmail, Hotmail,
Yahoo!, AOL and others. Facebook requested users to provide their passwords to
accounts on those websites in order to establish access, whilst denying the
competitors the chance to do the same.The district court ruled that Facebook was
under no obligation to give access to its user accounts merely because its
competitors gave it access. Introducing a new product that is not compatible with
those already present does not of itself constitute violation.83
5 CONCLUSIONS
Social media is a good example for the insight that the general rules of
competition law are flexible enough to adapt to the developments and new types
79 Also in this sense Yoo, supra n. 9, at 1154–1158 (2012), who argues that mandating data portability is
uncompelling because it threatens to structure interactions in a way that might limit functionality of
social media and similar systems.
80 See Joaquín Almunia, Statement on the Google Investigation, 5 Feb. 2014, SPEECH/14/93, available at
http://europa.eu/rapid/search.htm (accessed 3 Mar. 2014).
81 Article 18 of European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the
Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final of 25
Jan. 2012.
82 Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., [2012] WL 542586 (N.D. Cal. 16 Feb. 2012).
83 Yoo, supra n. 9, at 1158–1160 where he provides summaries of cases and the types of issues that have
already arisen in the social media context.
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of services available online.There is neither a justification to renounce competition
law control in cyberspace, nor a need for stricter rules in the field of network
economics. The key is to develop a dynamic understanding of competition law,
taking into account the impact of competition law enforcement on the incentives
to innovate, not only of the dominant firm but also of all market actors. Although
no radical change is required, the categories of competition law sometimes have to
be adapted. For example, we propose to transform the SSNIP test into a ‘SSNDQ’
test (small but significant non-transitory decrease in quality) in order to respond to
the ‘free’ character of many internet services, including social media, given the
two-sidedness of the relevant markets and high barriers to entry. On this basis,
potential abuses, exploitative and exclusionary, are identified. At present, no clear
abuse can be found. However, the analysis may be used to avoid competition law
infringements in the future.
Furthermore, data protection law is of particular importance in order to
minimize competition law problems from the outset. The Draft EU Data
Protection Regulation84 provides for data portability and the ‘right to be
forgotten’, which would have important consequences for social media as well.
These new rights would alleviate potential competition law concerns, but they
would not block the resort to competition law. In European economic law, it is
recognized that ‘general’ competition law and ‘specific’ regulatory law are
applicable simultaneously, as competition law has overarching goals which are not
exhausted by the regulatory purposes of the more targeted rules.85 Therefore,
dominant firms will still have to respect the general prohibition of abuse even if
data protection rules are tightened. It is the ambition of social media to inspire
new forms of interaction, creativity and visibility, thus strengthening decentralized
opinion making. It is of great importance that these goals are not foiled by abuses
of power by the new platforms themselves.
84 See n. 52. Art. 17 of the Draft Regulation contains the ‘Right to be forgotten and to erasure’.
85 See Weber, supra n. 9, at part 1.2.
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